Berressem, H. (2005) n-1 sexes.
Rhizomes, 11(12) . Retrieved July 7, 2006, http://www.rhizomes.net ... 11/berressem/index.html
Last edited by: sirfragalot 07 Jul 2006 10:46:44 Europe/Copenhagen
"the power of an ecosystem lies in its affectability and in its power to affect, in its elasticity|plasticity and in its openness to minor, molecular influences..."
Blesser, B., & Salter, L.-R. (2007).
Spaces speak, are you listening? Experiencing aural architecture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 12 Feb 2014 16:37:10 Europe/Copenhagen
"In all spatial experiences, there are two perspectives:
allocentric, from which objects are perceived relative to a fixed external framework; and egocentric, from which objects are perceived relative to the perceiver."
Local embellishments (fountain and alcove) affect only part of a larger area and are only heard close up whereas global embellishments affect all of that larger space e.g. reverberation). Typically, visual objects are local whereas acoustic objects are global.
Damasio, A. (2006).
Descartes' error Revised ed. London: Vintage.
Added by: sirfragalot 11 May 2012 09:04:40 Europe/Copenhagen
"the self is a repeatedly reconstructed biological state"
The outside world, the environment, is represented in the mind through the modifications it leads to in the body. The environment is represented "by modifying the primordial representations of the body proper whenever an interaction between organism and environment takes place." [...] The mind does this because it evolved to "ensure body survival as effectively as possible"
Fried, M. (1980).
Absorption and theatricality: Painting and beholder in the age of Diderot. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 11 Sep 2018 17:21:00 Europe/Copenhagen
Diderot's views call for an obliteration of the beholder's presence in front of the painting and the transportation of "the beholder's physical presence" to within the painting. Beholder and painting become "a closed and self-sufficient system".
Kromand, D. 2008, October 22—22
Sound and the diegesis in survival-horror games. Paper presented at Audio Mostly 2008, Piteå, Sweden.
Added by: sirfragalot 24 Nov 2008 11:12:05 Europe/Copenhagen
Debating Jørgensen's 'trans-diegetic' sound terminology: sound that crosses the barrier between diegetic and nondiegetic worlds (cf Count Basie's orchestra in Blazing Saddles at first seems nondiegetic until the hero comes across the orchestra playing in the desert at which point the music becomes diegetic.
Trans-diegesis is a short transgression of the barrier between diegetic/nondiegetic, not a breakdown. The trans-diegetic sound transfers information to the player from the game. Two types, 'reactive sound affirming player input or as a proactive sound informing the player of an altered game state (Jørgensen 2007; 116).'
Law, J. (1992) Notes on the theory of the actor network: Ordering, strategy and heterogeneity. . Retrieved July 14, 2006,
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/ ... rs/law-notes-on-ant.pdf
Added by: sirfragalot 04 Oct 2006 08:47:23 Europe/Copenhagen
"if these materials were to disappear then so too would what we sometimes call the social order. Actor-network theory says, then, that order is an effect generated by heterogeneous means"
Much of this is very similar to Autopoiesis.
Lumann, N. (1995).
Social systems J. Bednarz Jr. & D. Baecker, Trans. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 01 May 2008 13:15:33 Europe/Copenhagen
Luhmann understands autopoiesis as transferring "self-reference from the level of structural formation and structural change to that of the constitution of elements."
This does not mean that autopoietic systems lack reproductive operations -- these processes may only be used internally.
For Luhmann, self-organizing systems ask the question what are "the particular conditions under which the
repetition of a similar action or the expectation of the repetition of a similar experience is likely." Self-organizing systems are defined by their structures and structural formations. Conversely, autopoiesis, defined by the constitution of elements, asks: "How does one get from one elemental event to the next? [...] the basic problem lies not in repetition but in connectivity."
Interpenetration is "an intersystem relation between systems that are environments for each other [...] the
behavior of the penetrating system is co-determined by the receiving system [...] the receiving system also reacts to the structural formation of the penetrating system. [...] This means that greater degrees of freedom are possible in spite (better: because!) of increased dependencies. This also means that, in the course of evolution, interpenetration individualizes behavior more than penetration does."
"One can speak of interpenetration only if the systems that contribute their own complexity are autopoietic systems. Interpenetration is thus a relationship between autopoietic systems."
"Because a social system (like all other temporalized systems, including life) exists as elements that are events, it is confronted at every moment with the alternative of ceasing or continuing. It's "substance" continually vanishes so to speak, and must be reproduced with the help of structural models. [...] Autopoietic reproduction presupposes structural models, but it can innovatively or deviantly emerge from a situation if action remains communicable, meaningfully comprehensible, and capable of connection."
"Autopoiesis is not simply a new word for existence or life. Because one must bring time into consideration, precise constraints on the conditions of possibility result. A system must not simply maintain "itself", it must maintain its "essential variables" (Ashby). This includes the interdependence of dissolution and reproduction despite constantly vanishing elements. Functionally, this means sufficient structures to guarantee connectivity."
Autopoietic reproduction is confined to the elements defined in the system -- systems comprised of events reproduce only events.
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1980).
Autopoiesis and cognition: The realization of the living. Dordecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 20 Jun 2006 08:13:11 Europe/Copenhagen
"An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topologicial domain of its realization as such a network. It follows that an autopoietic machine continuously generates and specifies its own organization through its operation as a system of production of its own components ... Therefore, an autopoietic machine is an homeostatic (or rather a relations-static) system which has its own organization (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable which in maintains constant."
A non-autopoietic machine is specified by "relations between components [not by] relations between processes of production of components" (which is what specifies an autopoietic machine).
"Autopoietic machines are autonomous; that is, they subordinate all changes to the maintenance of their own organization, independently of how profoundly they may otherwise be transformed in the process."
"Autopoietic machines have individuality; that is, by keeping their organization as an invariant through its continuous production they actively maintain an identity which is independent of their interactions with an observer."
"Autopoietic machines are unities because, and only because, of their specific autopoietic organization: their operations specify their own boundaries in the processes of self-production."
"Autopoietic machines do not have inputs or outputs. They can be perturbated by independent events and undergo internal structural changes which compensate these perturbations. [These changes] are always subordinated to the maintenance of the machine organization, [a] condition which is definitory of the autopoietic machines ... although an autopoietic machine can be treated as an allopoietic machine, this treatment does not reveal its organization as an autopoietic machine."
"We can describe physical autopoietic machines, and also manipulate them, as parts of a larger system that defines the independent events which perturb them ... we can view these perturbing independent events as inputs, and the changes of the machine that compensate these perturbations as outputs. To do this, however, amounts to treating an autopoietic machine as an allopoietic one, and to recognize that if the independent perturbing events are regular in their nature and occurrence, an autopoietic machine can in fact be integrated into a larger system as a component allopoietic machine, without any alteration in its autopoieitc organization."
"We can analyze a physical autopoietic machine in its physical parts and treat all its partial homeostatic and regulatory mechanisms as allopoietic machines (sub-machines) by defining their input and output surfaces. Accordingly, these sub-machines are not necessarily components of an autopoietic machine because the relations that define such a machine need not be those that they generate through the input-output relations that define them."
"autopoiesis is neccessary and sufficient to characterize the organization of living systems."
Autopoietic and allopoietic machines are described only in terms of their organization in any particular state. The telonomic devices of
purpose, function etc. " have no explanatory value in the phenomenological domain which they pretend to illuminate because they do not refer to processes indeed operating in the generation of any of its phenomena."
"Living systems, as physical autopoietic machines, are purposeless systems."
"The domain of interactions of an autopoietic unity is the domain of all the deformations that it may undergo without loss of autopoiesis."
"...autopoiesis generates a phenomenological domain, this is cognition."
Maturana, H., & Varela, F. (1987).
The tree of knowledge: The biological roots of human understanding R. Paolucci, Trans. Boston: Shambhala.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 27 Mar 2006 08:08:13 Europe/Copenhagen
"The nervous system does not 'pick up information' from the environment ... The popular metaphor of calling the brain an 'information-processing device' is not only ambiguous but patently wrong"
Morgan, G. (1990).
Images of organization. London: Sage Publications.
Added by: sirfragalot 04 Nov 2006 15:41:57 Europe/Copenhagen
"From an autopoietic standpoint random variation provides the seed of possibility that allows the emergence and evolution of new system identities. Random changes can trigger interactions that reverberate throughout the system"
The autopoietic system "organizes its environment as part of itself [and] if we put ourselves "inside" such systems we come to realize that we are within a closed system of interaction and that the environment is
part of the system's organization because it is part of its domain of essential interaction ... a system's transactions with an environment are really transactions within itself"
Puterbaugh, J. (1999) Sonopoietic space. . Retrieved July 7, 2006,
http://www.music.prince ... n/sonopoietic_space.htm
Last edited by: sirfragalot 01 Nov 2006 14:46:11 Europe/Copenhagen
"Inspired by Maturana and Varela’s concept of
autopoiesis, I coined the term sonopoiesis by combining the Greek sono- (sound) and poiesis (creation, production). Sonopoietic space is the space of listening that we create through the act of listening to sound."
"notion of space must be defined more generally, such that “space is the domain of all possible interactions of a collection of unities (simple, or composite that interact as unities) that the properties of these unities establish by specifying its dimensions” (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p.33). Unities are formed by making distinctions. And listening is simply making distinctions in sound ... These distinctions become the basis of how we record the threads of our experience, form similarities, make generalizations and build larger structures and groupings out of our experience – how we construct our sonopoietic spaces. Every time we make new distinctions we add detail and dimensions to this sonopoietic space"