Anderson, M. L. (2003). Embodied cognition: A field guide.
Articificial Intelligence, 149, 91–130.
Added by: sirfragalot 17 Feb 2011 07:55:55 Europe/Copenhagen
Cognitivism derives from the Cartesian world view (that sensing and acting in the world does not require thinking -- the mind is separate from the body and this is what separates man and animals; man is capable of higher-level reasoning and abstraction).
Cognitivism -- thinking is a manipulation of abstract symbols according to explicit rules. Three elements to cognitivism: representation, formalism and transformation. Representation requires symbols pertaining to "specific features or states of affairs", but it is the form of the symbol (not its meaning) "that is the basis of its rule-based transformation."
Anderson critiques the AI framework 'sense-model-plan-act' (SMPA) as being insufficiently dynamic and not taking account of relevance. SMPA depends upon modelling an explicit representation of the world. How can one model for every potential situation and how does one decide which situations are relevant enough to be modelled as representations for future use?
Anderson notes some critiques of embodied cognition including its disregard for representation. He paraphrases David Kirsh's list of situations where representation is required in order to act (including future planning, use of conceptualization and creative activities that are "stimulus free").
Anderson suggests a hybrid model should be sought.
Benyon, D., Smyth, M., O'Neill, S., McCall, R., & Carroll, F. (2006). The place probe: Exploring a sense of place in real and virtual environments.
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 15(6), 668–687.
Added by: sirfragalot 16 Sep 2018 15:17:44 Europe/Copenhagen
"the sense of presence requires a body; it is not just a mental construct."
Clark, A. (2013). Expecting the world: Perception, prediction, and the origins of human knowledge.
Journal of Philosophy, CX(9), 469–496.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 26 Jul 2018 10:36:16 Europe/Copenhagen
The top-down, predictive model "puts together the most likely set of causes whose interaction would yield (hence explain) the present input."
Clark presents two alternate models of perception:
"What happens when, after a brief chat with a colleague, I re-enter my office and visually perceive the hot, steaming, red cup of coffee that I left waiting on my desk? One possibility is that my brain receives a swathe of visual signals (imagine, for simplicity, an array of activated pixels) that specify a number of elementary features such as lines, edges, and color patches. Those elementary features are then progressively accumulated and (where appropriate) bound together, yielding shapes and specifying relations. At some point, these complex shapes and relations activate bodies of stored knowledge, turning the flow of sensation into world-revealing perception: the seeing of coffee, steam, and cup, with the steaming bound to the coffee, the color red to the cup, and so on.
As I re-enter my office my brain already commands a complex set of coffee-involving expectations. Glancing at my desk sets off a chain of visual processing in which current bottom-up signals are met by a stream of downwards predictions concerning the anticipated states of various neuronal groups along the appropriate visual pathway. In essence, a multi-layer downwards cascade is attempting to "guess" the present states of all the key neuronal populations responding to the present state of the visual world. There ensues a rapid exchange (a dance between multiple top-down and bottom-up signals) in which incorrect guesses yield error signals which propagate forward, and are used to extract better guesses. When top-down guessing adequately accounts for the incoming signal, the visual scene is perceived. As this process unfolds, top-down processing is trying to generate the incoming sensory signal for itself. When and only when this succeeds, and a match is established, do we get to experience (veridically or otherwise) a meaningful visual scene."
Damasio, A. (2006).
Descartes' error Revised ed. London: Vintage.
Added by: sirfragalot 11 May 2012 09:04:40 Europe/Copenhagen
"[The body] contributes a
content that is part and parcel of the workings of the normal mind."
Evans, D. (2001).
Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 28 May 2011 07:52:39 Europe/Copenhagen
If consciousness depends on the capacity for subjective feelings and subjective feeling depend on the form of body one has, computer programs will always lack consciousness if they remain virtual. Hence 'evolutionary robotics' and 'embodied programs'.
Heidegger, M. (1962).
Being and time J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell.
Added by: sirfragalot 27 Sep 2019 16:57:31 Europe/Copenhagen
"knowing is not present-at-hand. In any case, it is not externally ascertainable as, let us say, bodily properties are."
Hermann, T., & Ritter, H. (2004). Sound and meaning in auditory data display.
Proceedings of the IEEE, 92(4), 730–741.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 25 Jun 2013 12:29:07 Europe/Copenhagen
"Taking a perspective motivated by ecological acoustics, we will then gradually work backward in evolutionary history to bring into view increasingly more basic constituents of auditory perception that became particularly apparent as “ basic expression,” and will connect these to more elementary dimensions of meaning, whose deepest roots ultimately can be seen in physics, reflecting very fundamental laws that connect physical and geometrical properties of our environment to sound characteristics in a rather universal manner, invariant over a wide range of conditions and time scales, so that evolution found ample occasion and time to imprint these regularities deeply into the brains of our predecessors and ourselves."
"...the laws of physics themselves can be viewed as a kind of context information for extracting meaning from sound events. Compared to other contexts, the context given by physical laws was stable all the time, so that evolution had ample time to adapt our brains extremely well to the ways how physics links sounds and their causes."
"pitch at the extremal ends of the frequency spectrum reinforces the threatening character of intense sounds and the comforting character of weak sounds."
Ihde, D. (2010).
Embodied technics. Automatic Press / VIP.
Added by: sirfragalot 10 Jan 2016 08:58:11 Europe/Copenhagen
"To recognize that directed, intentional human experience can
embody a technology is a first step towards a postphenomenology in that a material artifact can be taken into first person experience"
Ihde explains "old fashioned" phenomenology as "a
whole body experience of my immediate environment."
Ihde uses the example of the telescope for postphenomenology: "The telescope [...] is taken into my now extended and mediated bodily experience:
(Human-instrument) > World phenomena"
Kilteni, K., Groten, R., & Slater, M. (2012). The sense of embodiment in virtual reality.
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 21(4), 373–387.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 16 Oct 2018 09:48:14 Europe/Copenhagen
Definition of sense of embodiment: "SoE toward a body B is the sense that emerges when B’s properties are processed as if they were the properties of one’s own biological body."
Loomis, J. M. (1992). Distal attribution and presence.
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 1(1), 113–119.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 11 Sep 2018 17:19:04 Europe/Copenhagen
Externalization or distal attribution: "that most of our perceptual experience, though originating with stimulation of our sense organs, is referred to external space beyond the limits of our sensory organs."
There is a phenomenal world that can be divided into 'self' and 'nonself' – the physical self is closely tied to the phenomenal self but not necessarily (e.g. phantom limbs).
Distal attribution is the process of identifying sensory experience with a phenomenally external space or the nonself. This identification (and thus distal attribution) results when afference (sensory input) is "lawfully related" to efference (motorsensory actions) – e.g. I do something and the sensory feedback I get accords with that action.
Loomis hypothesizes that "attribution to self occurs when afference and efference are completely unrelated or independent."
"for vision and audition [...] the resulting perceptions are always mediate, never direct, for the central nervous system constructs what is perceived."
In arguing that distal attribution re telepresence is most clearly felt when the operators have become skilled with the equipment, Loomis suggests that with regard to a lawful relationship between efference and afference, the operator must be able to model this relationship. This 'linkage' becomes transparent with experience and this leads to the externalization of the distal environment.
"presence and distal attribution beyond the limits of some extending device (probe, teleoperator, virtual display) are not fundamentally different phenomena. Rather, they differ only that true presence occurs when the sensory data support only the interpretation of being somewhere other than where the sense organs are located; whereas, distal attribution to a remote location occurs when the sensory data represent both the remote location and that device or linkage that connects the observer with that remote location."
Riddoch, M. 2012, September 9—14
On the non-cochlearity of the sounds themselves. Paper presented at International Computer Music Conference.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 04 May 2014 13:00:49 Europe/Copenhagen
Riddoch proposes three types of non-cochlear sound:
Synaesthetic -- the perception of sound via stimulation of another sense.
Infrasonic sound -- sound waves below 20Hz can be detected by the skin and the chest cavity resonates at 80Hz and below. Riddoch also points to the example of profoundly deaf (from birth) percussionist Evelyn Glennie (1993) who maintains that hearing is a specialized form of touch.
Auditory imagination -- including memory, imagination, hallucination, dreaming which all excite the auditory cortex.
Szabó Gendler, T. (2010).
Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 18 Apr 2013 17:40:14 Europe/Copenhagen
"mental representations can be activated in a multitude of ways, and [...] awakening the associative patterns linked with a particular stereotype, mental image, or protocol, or motor routine tends to awaken the perception and action dispositions associated with it."
An essay about the reliability of judgments derived from imaginary scenarios and thought experiments.
The conclusion is that judgments are often not reliable because the derivation of such judgments proceeds from the framing of the scenario. i.e. the telling of the story affects the outcome.
Successful imagination may be incomplete or incoherent -- exhibit disparity. If incomplete, even in pretense, some features may be unspecified or unspecifiable. If incoherent, some features are logically or conceptually incompatible. The illusion that the pretense is complete and coherent comes "from imaginative reliance on a picture that treats imagining as just like belief, only off-line, and from a picture of prop-based pretense that treats principles of generation as complete, uniform mappings from one realm to another." (p.150).
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition.
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 9(4), 625–636.
Added by: sirfragalot 06 Jun 2014 14:27:09 Europe/Copenhagen
Wilson states that the theoretical starting point for emobodied cognition is that the body needs the mind to function. However, view 6. (off-line cognition is body-based) suggests that the mind requires the body in order to function. Wilson suggests as much on p.15.
cf definitions of imagination that is a (re)construction of past sensory experiences and perceptions.
re off-loading cognitive work onto the environment. An argument that authenticity/reality is not required in VEs and that VEs can aid rapid/efficient cognition by pre-reducing the amount of information to be processed through the use of caricature and reduction (cf verisimilitude).
symbolic off-loading -- cf icons, earcons, caricature etc. in VEs.
re 'cognition is for action'. Wilson states that motor activity can be 'primed' by certain visual stimuli. Can some sounds prime the body for flight or fight?
Where emobodied cognition is time-pressured, there are different spans of time involved. The cognition involved in hunting/gathering food, for example, takes place under a long (even continuous) time pressure -- if no food for a week then you starve.