Bouchard, S., St-Jacques, J., Robillard, G., & Renaud, P. (2008). Anxiety increases the feeling of presence in virtual reality.
Presence: Teleoperators and Virtual Environments, 17(4), 376–391.
Added by: sirfragalot 25 Sep 2018 16:28:33 Europe/Copenhagen
If anxiety is a mild form of fear is it related to greater attention to the sensory world (being anxious to survive) and so a larger salient horizon? Is the extent of the salient horizon directly related to presence?
Not only external factors but also "psychological states and appraisal patterns of users might also affect presence."
Evans, D. (2001).
Emotion: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 28 May 2011 07:52:39 Europe/Copenhagen
"...fear is probably one of the first meotions to have ever evolved."
All animals descended from the first vertebrates have the capacity for fear.
Two pathways related to fear in the brain. The shorter leads to quicker responses but can be wrong -- e.g. false fire alarms. The second is longer and slower, passsing through the sensory cortex allowing us to consider the risk and to cut off the initial fear response if the danger is not real.
Heidegger, M. (1962).
Being and time J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans. Oxford: Blackwell.
Added by: sirfragalot 27 Sep 2019 16:57:31 Europe/Copenhagen
"Ony something which is in the the state-of-mind of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that which is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openess to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind.""
"As we have said earlier, a state-of-mind makes manifest 'how one is'. In anxiety one feels '
uncanny'. [...] "as Dasien falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses."
Szabó Gendler, T. (2010).
Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 18 Apr 2013 17:40:14 Europe/Copenhagen
Discussing the work of Walton. Walton denied that fictional emotions were real, actual emotions. For example, the object of the emotion must exist (be non-fictional) otherwise these 'quasi-emotions' do not lead to motivation and action. "Fear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton, Kendall. (1990).
Mimesis as Make-believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp.201-202). To this SG responds by saying emotions are genuine, and non-fictional, when we review past events (death of a relative) or imagine future events (stock market crash) and neither of these require the object of the emotion to be present.