Clark, A. (2013). Expecting the world: Perception, prediction, and the origins of human knowledge.
Journal of Philosophy, CX(9), 469–496.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 26 Jul 2018 10:36:16 Europe/Copenhagen
The top-down, predictive model "puts together the most likely set of causes whose interaction would yield (hence explain) the present input."
Clark presents two alternate models of perception:
"What happens when, after a brief chat with a colleague, I re-enter my office and visually perceive the hot, steaming, red cup of coffee that I left waiting on my desk? One possibility is that my brain receives a swathe of visual signals (imagine, for simplicity, an array of activated pixels) that specify a number of elementary features such as lines, edges, and color patches. Those elementary features are then progressively accumulated and (where appropriate) bound together, yielding shapes and specifying relations. At some point, these complex shapes and relations activate bodies of stored knowledge, turning the flow of sensation into world-revealing perception: the seeing of coffee, steam, and cup, with the steaming bound to the coffee, the color red to the cup, and so on.
As I re-enter my office my brain already commands a complex set of coffee-involving expectations. Glancing at my desk sets off a chain of visual processing in which current bottom-up signals are met by a stream of downwards predictions concerning the anticipated states of various neuronal groups along the appropriate visual pathway. In essence, a multi-layer downwards cascade is attempting to "guess" the present states of all the key neuronal populations responding to the present state of the visual world. There ensues a rapid exchange (a dance between multiple top-down and bottom-up signals) in which incorrect guesses yield error signals which propagate forward, and are used to extract better guesses. When top-down guessing adequately accounts for the incoming signal, the visual scene is perceived. As this process unfolds, top-down processing is trying to generate the incoming sensory signal for itself. When and only when this succeeds, and a match is established, do we get to experience (veridically or otherwise) a meaningful visual scene."
Prediction-based models that Clark espouses "learn to construct the sensory signal by combining probabilistic representations of hidden causes operating at many different spatial and temporal scales [...] they must match the incoming sensory signal by constructing the signal from combinations of hidden causes (latent variables). The so-called 'transparency' of perception emerges as a natural consequence of such a process when it is conditioned by an embodied agent's lifestyle-specific capacities to act and to choose. We seem to see dogs, cats, chasings, pursuits, captures [...] because these feature among the interesting, nested, structures of distal causes that matter for human choice and action."
Forrester, M. A. (2007). Auditory perception and sound as event: Theorising sound imagery in psychology.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 08 Jan 2017 14:25:50 Europe/Copenhagen
Sounds "have the potential to make people 'feel again' sensations from the distant past"
Ihde, D. (2007).
Listening and voice: Phenomenologies of sound 2nd ed. Albany (NY): State University of New York Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 10 Jan 2016 09:21:22 Europe/Copenhagen
In Heideggerian terms, Ihde describes the auditory horizon as the point at which sounds are given over into the present. Sound is a giving and listening is what "lets come into presence the unbidden giving of sound."
Pasnau, R. (1999). What is sound?
The Philosophical Quarterly, 49(196), 309–324.
Added by: sirfragalot 25 Jun 2013 12:59:40 Europe/Copenhagen
"in a body making a sound, that sound is only potential; the sound is made actual in the medium".
Scruton, R. (2009). Sounds as secondary objects and pure events. In M. Nudds & C. O'Callaghan (Eds),
Sounds & Perception (pp. 50–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Added by: sirfragalot 07 Feb 2014 14:10:14 Europe/Copenhagen
To Scruton, sound's independence from the physical world leads to a coherence (grouping, streaming) that is a 'virtual causality'. It bears no relation to the process by which sounds are formed.
Szabó Gendler, T. (2010).
Intuition, imagination, & philosophical methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Last edited by: sirfragalot 18 Apr 2013 17:40:14 Europe/Copenhagen
"...by presenting context in a suitably concrete or abstract way, thought experiments may recruit representational schemas that were previously inactive. As a result, they may evoke responses that run counter to those evoked by alternative presentations of relevantly similar content."
Reasoning (according to Steven Sloman's Two Systems) involves two systems: Associative and Rule-based. The first (System 1) operates on similarity, contiguity, is automatic, uses generalization, soft constraints and is exemplified by intuition, imagination, fantasy, creativity etc.
Rule-based reasoning (System 2) uses symbol manipulation, derives knowledge from language, culture and formal systems, uses hard constraints, can operate on concrete, general and abstract concepts and is exmplified by explanation, deliberation, verification, formal analysis, strategic memory. Division into two systems may be simplisitic but there is certainly not just one system used for reasoning.